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Lectures
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL IDEALt
Drew S. Days, III*
T is an honor to join the list of illustrious persons who have been
asked to deliver the prestigious Alfred P. Murrah Lecture. Although
the title of my lecture is "The Solicitor General and the American
Legal Ideal," I want to make clear at the beginning that I do not claim for
myself the mantle of the ideal lawyer. After being the Solicitor General
for almost two years, however, I have reached some tentative observa-
tions on how my office, the Office of the Solicitor General of the United
States, has in some measure been able to attain and maintain the mental-
ity of the ideal lawyer of yesteryear.
Let me start, though, with some observations about America's attitude
towards lawyers. Given the recent tendency of politicians and the media
to depict lawyers as the root of many of the country's ills, it will probably
not surprise many of you to learn that in a recent (1993) survey,' 52 per-
cent of Americans could not name a lawyer they admired.2 Of those that
could, two of the top five were the television characters Matlock and
Perry Mason, and another, Justice Thurgood Marshall, is dead.3 The two
remaining were F. Lee Bailey, the noted trial attorney, and my boss, Janet
Reno, the Attorney General! 4
These findings were confirmed by a 1993 poll by the American Bar
Association which found that only 40 percent of those surveyed gave law-
t This article is a lightly revised and annotated version of the Alfred P. Murrah
Lecture delivered at Southern Methodist University School of Law on February 2, 1995.
* Solicitor General of the United States. B.A. Hamilton College, 1963; L.L.B. Yale
Law School, 1966. Prior to assuming his post as Solicitor General in May of 1993, Mr.
Days was Professor of Law at Yale University School of Law, where he taught and wrote in
the fields of civil procedure, federal jurisdiction, Supreme Court practice, antidiscrimina-
tion law, comparative constitutional law (Canada and the United States) and international
human rights. From 1988 to 1993, he was also the Director of the Orville H. Schell Jr.
Center for Human Rights at Yale University School of Law. From 1977 until 1980, Mr.
Days was the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. He previously served on the
staff of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from 1969 until 1977.
1. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 20, 22,
24.




yers a favorable rating, just above the 28 percent received by stockbro-
kers and the 21 percent for politicians.5 The ABA study also suggested
that "familiarity breeds contempt" in this regard, since those having most
contact with lawyers were likely to be least positively disposed toward the
profession.6
More recent surveys confirm that America is not enamored of the legal
profession. U.S. News and World Report reported this week that 69 per-
cent of Americans say lawyers are only sometimes honest or not usually
honest, and 56 percent believe that lawyers use the system to protect the
powerful and get rich.7 And even F. Lee Bailey may be in trouble, for
polls indicate that 25 percent of Americans have less respect for lawyers
in general after watching preliminary hearings in the O.J. Simpson trial.8
One news report suggested that the headline with respect to the criti-
cism of lawyers today was not that non-lawyers held lawyers in low es-
teem, since such an attitude follows in the long tradition of lawyer-
bashers from Shakespeare and Martin Luther to Benjamin Franklin.
Rather, it was that even lawyers are beginning to hate each other, that the
profession has turned upon itself in masochistic ways previously unob-
served. Perhaps the most overt example of this trend can be found in the
logo of a company created some years ago by a lapsed lawyer to publish
self-help legal manuals such as do-it-yourself divorce kits. The logo
shows a necktied shark holding a briefcase, across which is drawn a diago-
nal red slash!
I am not really in a position to determine to what extent self-loathing
within the legal profession has reached unprecedented heights in recent
years. It may well be that perennial concerns have simply gained greater
media attention of late. Of more interest to me is that discussions of this
topic in legal, professional, and academic journals often seek to contrast
the perceived deficient lawyer of today with the respected "complete"
lawyer of yesteryear, to identify the "ideal" lawyer against whom every-
one else, particularly one's adversaries, ought to be unfavorably
compared.
Describing this "ideal" lawyer is not an easy task, although my col-
league and now Dean at Yale Law School, Anthony Kronman, has made
an impressive effort to do so in his book The Lost Lawyer. Kronman calls
him "the lawyer-statesman" who is, at once, a devoted public citizen,
looked to for advice not only about means but also ends, possessed of
extraordinary deliberative power, and exceptionally wise. 9 Kronman ar-
gues that "two traits set the statesman apart: first, love of the public
5. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi. The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 62.
6. Id.
7. Stephen Budiansky, How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 52.
8. Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52, 53.




good, and second, wisdom in deliberating about it."1° The statesman is
one who aims at the good of the community to which he or she belongs."
This approach, of course, may demand more than any one lawyer could
ever satisfy, leaving us to wonder whether it provides much help in evalu-
ating living and breathing human beings.
Others have attempted in less philosophically and historically rigorous
fashion than Kronman to identify the special qualities that traditionally
characterized great lawyers in American history and can be found on oc-
casion among members of today's bench and bar. This latter approach,
however, runs the risk of falling into nostalgia for the "good old days"
and endowing certain prominent figures from the past with qualities their
colleagues and clients would have found surprising. TWo new books have,
in my opinion, overcome that obstacle. In The Betrayed Profession,'2 my
friend and hero Sol Linowitz successfully blends the personal and the his-
torical. The book was written, Linowitz says, "to offer some suggestions
as to how we lawyers might rekindle pride in our profession and restore
the practice of law to the respected position it once occupied.' 3 Li-
nowitz, for example, quotes favorably a remark attributed to one of his
mentors, the distinguished Elihu Root, a Wall Street lawyer and Secretary
of State. Root is reported to have once told a client, "The law lets you do
it, but don't .... It's a rotten thing to do.' ' 4
Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon's much discussed book, A
Nation Under Lawyers,'5 also uses personal experiences and historical
and sociological data to question whether our profession has undergone a
change for the worse in recent years. Glendon observes that "it was once
... [the] lawyer's duty to persuade the client to attend to the spirit as well
as the letter of the law."'1 6 She rejects what she sees as the more modem
view of the lawyer as "friend-of-the-client," first and foremost.'
7
I am not prepared to say that there was ever a "golden age" of lawyer-
ing, especially given the undisputed exclusion of minorities, women, and
Jews from the mainstream legal establishment until quite recently, as well
as the failure of the legal community to concern itself with the legal needs
of the least well-off. But there was a vision of an ideal lawyer, Kronman's
lawyer-statesmen, one which was more complex than the client-centered
win-at-all-costs vision of lawyers which is prevalent in some circles today.
With all this in mind, I wondered if it was possible to get beyond
merely cataloguing the traits that an ideal lawyer should possess or
describing lawyers that we think, in some less systematic way, embody
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id.
12. SOL M. LINowrrz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
13. Id. at xii.
14. Id. at 48.
15. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994).
16. Id. at 37.
17. Id. at 38.
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such an ideal. Can't we find greater certainty anywhere? What does an
ideal lawyer do all day? What does the job description of an ideal lawyer
look like?
Let me suggest one answer to these questions which derives from my
personal experience. Ever since I was nominated to become the Solicitor
General of the United States almost two years ago, hardly a day has gone
by that I have not been told by another lawyer that I have the best law-
yer's job in America. Now, there may be many explanations for why this
is said. Clearly, most lawyers do not have their pick of interesting, impor-
tant cases to handle or the opportunity to argue a half-dozen times a term
before the Supreme Court. And being the Government's top lawyer has
its other privileges. But I think that such comments are motivated by
other considerations.
Perhaps unconsciously, lawyers may covet the job of Solicitor General
because they believe it offers those who occupy that position the opportu-
nity to act in ways that come closest to their version of what the ideal
lawyer should be and demans qualities that the ideal lawyer should pos-
sess. Whether any particular incumbent rises to the occasion is another
matter; the important point is that the office is rightfully perceived to
provide the possibilities for lawyering unlikely to be found elsewhere in
the profession.
I do not intend to recite the history of my office. Suffice it to say, the
Office of the Solicitor General was established in 1870 in order to provide
the Attorney General with assistance in the discharging of his official du-
ties. 18 Over the intervening one hundred and twenty-five years, however,
a tradition of independence, both within the Department of Justice and
the Executive Branch as a whole, has developed with respect to the Solic-
itor General's role. Although the Solicitor General is appointed by the
President and works for the Attorney General, it is rare for his decisions
to be overruled by either of his superiors. Consequently, for most pur-
poses, the Solicitor General has the last word with respect to whether and
on what grounds the United States will seek review in the Supreme Court
and determines what cases from the federal trial courts the Government
will seek to appeal.
In this process, the Solicitor General is not a "hired gun." Indeed, he
has a captive client, who may not seek new counsel if he receives disa-
greeable legal advice. One of my predecessors, Solicitor General, later
Attorney General, Francis Biddle, was prompted by this circumstance to
remark:
[The Solicitor General] determines what cases to appeal, and the cli-
ent has no say in the matter, he does what his lawyer tells him, the
lawyer stands in his client's shoes, for the client is but an abstraction




.... [H]is guide is only the ethic of his own profession framed in the
ambience of his experience and judgment.19
This is a rather rhapsodic and inaccurate picture of the Solicitor General's
role. But it does capture the fact that his responsibility is ultimately not
to any particular agency or person in the federal government but rather
"the interests of the United States" which may, on occasion, conflict with
the short-term programmatic goals of an affected governmental entity.
The Supreme Court recognized this tension when it noted this term
that:
the practice... [of concentrating the litigating authority in the Solici-
tor General] serves the Government well; an individual Government
agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the interest of the
Government in litigation than does the Solicitor General's office,
with its broader view of litigation in which the Government is in-
volved throughout the state and federal court systems. Whether re-
view of a decision adverse to the Government in a court of appeals
should be sought depends on a number of factors which do not lend
themselves to easy categorization. The Government as a whole is
apt to fare better if these decisions are concentrated in a single
official.20
To be sure, the Solicitor General is not a policy-maker in the sense that
other presidential appointees at the Cabinet and sub-cabinet levels are.
But in the course of acting as a legal policy-maker regarding governmen-
tal litigation, he acts as a lawyer-statesman, advising his colleagues not
only as to means to achieve certain ends but also helping them to clarify
ends in light of wisdom that is often gained from court challenges to fed-
eral policies.
Aside from having a client who cannot seek other representation, it is
also true that the Solicitor General occupies an especially prominent po-
sition as an officer of the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
where the "ethics of his profession framed in the ambience of his experi-
ence and judgment" 21 must be punctiliously observed. Even if he were
not inclined for reasons of principle to adhere to high standards of candor
and fair dealing before the Court, the pragmatics of his "repeat player"
status before the Court would require such adherence. For example, law-
yers on my staff and I have argued in forty of the fifty-two cases heard by
the Court so far this term.22 Thus, like an ideal lawyer of old, the Solici-
tor General's long-term relationship with the Court reinforces his duties
as an officer of that Court and creates a sense of trust and obligation.
In so many ways, the Solicitor General is invited by tradition, as well as
statute and regulation, to step out from the role of partisan advocate to
assist in the orderly development of the law and to insist that justice be
19. FRANCiS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
20. Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537, 542
(1994).
21. BIDDLE, supra note 19, at 97.
22. As of January 19, 1995.
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done even where the immediate interests of the federal government may
not appear to benefit. For, as it is inscribed on the walls of the Depart-
ment of Justice, "The United States wins its point whenever justice is
done its citizens in the courts. '23 Let me give four examples of how the
Solicitor General acts in the interests of justice.
First, Solicitors General have "acquiesced" in efforts by opponents in
litigation to obtain Supreme Court review of cases in which the govern-
ment prevailed below. They have done so because, while confident of the
government's position, they believed that it was in the best interest of the
country to have a contested legal question definitively resolved by the
Supreme Court. For example, in a case called O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC,24 the government prevailed in the Ninth Circuit on the question of
whether state or federal law governed in certain instances when the FDIC
became the receiver of a failed savings and loan. When the private party
in the court of appeals sought certiorari, we told the Supreme Court it
ought to hear the case, putting at risk our victory below, because of the
"profound importance" of the question in terms of both money (over a
billion dollars) and the need for a uniform national standard. 25 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and
decisively rejected each of our arguments.26 I do not regret our decision
to acquiesce, for we got what was required-a definitive statement of the
law on an issue of public importance.
Second, Solicitors General have "confessed error" in cases where the
government has won in the lower courts but the Solicitor General con-
cluded that a "fundamental error" had led to that result. In many cases,
as in life itself, fundamental error is found in the details, and I think that
is reflected in the cases in which I have confessed error. Cases like Reed
v. United States27 are typical. In Reed, a crack dealer argued that the
district court had miscalculated the amount of drugs she had distributed
and thus had sentenced her to an extra five years in prison. The court of
appeals rejected her argument, 28 but when the case got to my office, a
fresh look at the undisputed facts indicated that she was right. We asked
the Supreme Court to vacate our "victory" and remand for further pro-
ceedings, and the Court did so.29
I should note that lower court judges do not look favorably upon con-
fessions of error. Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff, who later served on
23. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 & n.2 (1963).
24. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1993).
25. Brief for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at 4-5, O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994) (No. 93-489).
26. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
27. 114 S.Ct. 1289 (1994).
28. United States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 472,
and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1308 (1994), and vacated sub nom. Reed v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1289 (1994).
29. Reed, 114 S.Ct. at 1289; see also, e.g., Mohwish v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1378(1993). See generally David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by
the Solicitor General, 82 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2079 (1994).
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the federal court of appeals, was quoted as saying: "When I was Solicitor
General,... I thought that confessing error was the noblest function of
the office. Now that I am a Circuit Judge, I know it is the lowest trick one
lawyer can play upon another. '30
And Judge Learned Hand, the subject of Professor Gerald Gunther's
well-received new biography, said: "It is bad enough to have the
Supreme Court reverse you, but I will be damned if I will be reversed by
some Solicitor General."'31
Third, the Solicitor General is often asked formally by the Supreme
Court through a process referred to in the relevant jargon as "CVSG" (or
"call for the views of the Solicitor General") to express his views on
whether a pending petition for certiorari in a non-government case
should be granted. In such instances, the Court is not seeking the advice
of an advocate or a partisan, but rather of an officer of thatcourt commit-
ted to providing his best judgment with respect to the matter at issue.
Thus, as many of you might have heard, my office recently filed a brief
in the case of Brett Kimberlin, a federal prisoner who claimed that his
right to hold a press conference regarding former Vice-President
Quayle's alleged drug use was unconstitutionally interfered with. The
legal issue before the Court regarded the proper standards for reviewing
qualified immunity claims of government officials. Even though the de-
fendants in the case are all federal officials who had prevailed in the court
of appeals, we took the position that the Court should grant certiorari
and reverse because the lower court's decision imposed a burden on the
plaintiff which was "incorrect" and conflicted with "well established"
law. 32 Although the ruling of the lower court may have favored the
United States and its employees, we opposed it because we believed it
was contrary to the long-term interests of the law.
Fourth, and finally, there are rare occasions when the Solicitor General
will decline to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute. Because
of the respect to which the Congress is entitled as a coordinate branch of
government, Solicitors General traditionally have recognized a general
duty to defend congressional statutes against constitutional challenges.
But owing to the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land,33 and the President-and by extension the Solicitor General-has a
duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," 34 Solicitors Gen-
eral have not risen to the defense of the Acts of Congress in two situa-
tions. First, Solicitors General have always sided with the President in
disputes over the constitutionality of congressional attempts to circum-
30. Archibald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 Cmi. B. REc. 221, 225
(1963).
31. Id. at 224-25.
32. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 115
S. Ct. 2552 (1995) (No. 93-2068).
33. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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scribe presidential power. The first such case was Myers v. United States35
in 1926, in which the Solicitor General successfully argued that Congress
had impermissibly intruded upon the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch by limiting the President's power to remove a postmaster. In that
case, the Court invited Senator George Wharton Pepper to argue on be-
half of Congress in defense of the legislation. 36
The second situation in which the Solicitor General will not defend a
statute is when he determines that the law is patently unconstitutional.
"In such cases," Solicitor General Wade McCree has written, "the Solici-
tor General's Office is called upon to give full faith and credit to the
fundamental law embodied in the Constitution, even at the expense of
the federal statute. '37 The decision to abandon a statute is made only in
the most extreme instances. When Attorney General Griffin Bell in-
formed Congress that the Justice Department would not appeal decisions
invalidating statutes, his letters always ended with the following state-
ment: "The Department of Justice is, of course, fully mindful of its duty
to support the laws enacted by Congress. Here, however, the Depart-
ment has determined, after careful study and deliberation, that reason-
able arguments cannot be advanced to defend the [statute] at issue." '38
I admit there is a tension for those who believe that the Solicitor Gen-
eral, like the ideal lawyer-statesman, should exercise independent judg-
ment in all circumstances. But the policy of defending all but the most
blatantly unconstitutional congressional statutes must be viewed in the
light of strong separation of powers concerns. Granting the Solicitor
General broader latitude would permit the Executive Branch to use liti-
gation as a form of post-enactment veto of legislation that the Adminis-
tration dislikes, while permitting Congress to defend its own statutes
would undermine the Executive Branch's status as the litigating arm of
the government.39
Thus far, I have declined in a few instances to defend acts of Congress
on one or the other of these grounds. When such declinations occur,
Congress is so advised and may assume responsibility for the defense it-
self.40 In one instance, we chose not to appeal a district court decision
35. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
36. Id. at 21.
37. Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337,
343-344 (1981).
38. Letter from Griffin Bell, Attorney General, to Robert Byrd, Senate Majority
Leader 2 (May 8, 1979) (on file with author).
39. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLIcITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW
86-87 (1992); Joshua I. Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General's Independence,
21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1119, 1152-1154 (1988).
40. The Attorney General is required by law to notify the Congress of any decision by
the Solicitor General (or the Attorney General) not to defend an Act of Congress. The
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 provides in part:
The Attorney General shall notify the [Senate Legal] Counsel with respect to
any proceeding in which the United States is a party of any determination by
the Attorney General or Solicitor General not to appeal any court decision
affecting the constitutionality of an Act or joint resolution of Congress within
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which struck down on First Amendment grounds a statute that prohibited
the use of the name "Crazy Horse" on beer labels.41 Congress seemed to
accept the decision not to go forward.
In another set of cases, the situation was more complicated. Prior to
1934, Congress had provided that children born outside the United States
in a marriage between an American citizen and a foreign national were
American citizens if their father was a citizen, but were not citizens if
only their mother was a citizen.42 While this distinction may seem invidi-
ous to modern ears, it was consistent with the prevailing international
standards of the time. In 1934, Congress abolished the distinction be-
tween citizen fathers and mothers, but applied it prospectively only. Re-
cently, foreign-born children of American women have sought relief in
federal court, claiming that the pre-1934 statute violated equal protection.
In the leading case, Wauchope v. United States Department of State,43 the
Ninth Circuit held that the government had failed to sustain its burden of
maintaining a classification based on gender, declared the statute uncon-
stitutional, and awarded the plaintiffs citizenship." It is fair to say that
we had serious reservations about many of the court's legal holdings, in-
cluding questions of standing, laches, and especially the remedy. But on
the crucial question of constitutionality of the classification, the Attorney
General, acting on my recommendation, informed Congress that "[tihe
Ninth Circuit's ruling on the merits is consistent with modern develop-
ments in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning statutory distinc-
tions based on gender," and thus we decided not to seek certiorari or
otherwise challenge the holding.45 Since that time, the Administration
has worked with Congress to amend the statute at issue to grant these
persons citizenship retroactively. 46
I have not taken your time this afternoon just to let you know how
happy I am to be the fortieth Solicitor General, although that is very true.
This speech is also not intended to be an advertisement for myself. Be-
lieve me, I am still learning my way around the office, so to speak.
Rather, my objective was to describe for you an institution where the
lawyer is expected to look not only to the interests of his client, but also to
the long-term effects upon the government, and upon the country, of po-
such time as will enable the Senate to direct the Counsel to intervene as a
party in such proceeding pursuant to section 288e of this title.
2 U.S.C. § 288k(b) (1988). Congress has also imposed such a requirement through annual
appropriations measures. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 98-411, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1558 (1984); Pub.
L. No. 96-132, § 21(a), 93 Stat. 1049-50 (1979); Pub. L. No. 95-624, § 13, 92 Stat. 3464
(1978); see also Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873-74 & n.3 (1984).
41. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
42. Rev. Stat. of 1874, § 1993 (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10
Stat. 604).
43. 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).
44. Id at 1419.
45. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Michael Davidson, Senate Legal
Counsel 2-3 (Oct. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
46. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-416, § 1, tit. I, 108 Stat. 4305, 4306 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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sitions taken in Court; is expected to forfeit victories in the interest of the
greater good of justice; and is expected to exhibit "absolute candor and
fair dealing" before the courts in the faithful discharge of his
responsibilities.
The demands of this job, I would suggest again, are ones that most
lawyers deep down believe the ideals of the profession require of them
and of their brothers and sisters at the bar. As Elihu Root is supposed to
have said, "About half the practice of a decent lawyer [should consist] in
telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop. '47 It
is that odd circumstance in which an office, rather than a person or a
philosophical construct, comes closest to capturing the concept of the
"ideal lawyer."
Despite the unique confluence of factors which in a sense demand the
Solicitor General to strive towards the ideal, the path is not easy. For all
the impressive powers of the Solicitor General and the special role that
he plays in the management of federal litigation, in fact the job is filled
with difficult conflicts with respect to issues such as who is one's client,
how does one separate policy and law, what are long-range as opposed to
short-range interests of the United States, and where does one draw the
line between the demands of one's duty as an advocate for the Executive
Branch and one's responsibilities as an officer of the Court. The ideal
and the reality are sometimes in painful tension.
As the late Solicitor General Dean Erwin Griswold said about the So-
licitor General's job, "it can on occasion be a tightrope, but the Solicitor
General should keep his balance. 48 But I am not the only one who
should be practicing a balancing act. Practitioners will likely confront sit-
uations where they must decide whether they can represent certain cli-
ents and still remain true to their own values. They will have to resolve
conflicts between their responsibility to clients and their duty as officers
of the court. They will have to give clients advice that they would rather
not hear and rather not pay to hear. It is not a simple task to keep one's
balance, but it is possible if a lawyer has the right tools.
This is where the academy comes in. You must help to foster an atmos-
phere where discussion of ethics is expected, not exceptional. You must
work to instill in your students a sense of ideals in the law, not just zeal
for a client's cause. We all must work to make notions of the lawyer-
statesman a ruler by which we judge our own conduct, as well as the con-
duct of those whom we celebrate. While we may never measure up to the
myth-shrouded figures of the past, we should not shrink from the task for
fear of falling short. It is our future, and the future of our profession,
which are at stake.
Thank you.
47. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 37.
48. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS
OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY LAWYER 330 (1992).
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